A person learns by trial and error if he occasionally tries out new strategies, rejecting choices that are erroneous in the sense that they do not lead to higher payoffs. In a game, however, strategies can become erroneous due to a change of behavior by someone else. Such passive errors may also trigger a search for new and better strategies, but the nature of the search is different than when a player is actively engaged in experimentation. This paper introduces a simple version of this idea, called interactive trial and error learning, which has the property that it implements Nash equilibrium behavior in games that have at least one pure Nash equilibrium and no payoff ties. Unlike regret testing (Foster and Young, 2006) , it requires no statistical estimation. Unlike a learning procedure proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell (2006) , it requires no knowledge of the other players' actions: learning proceeds purely by responding to one's own payoff history.
Introduction
Consider a situation in which people interact, but they do not know how their interactions affect their payoffs. In other words, they are engaged in a game, but they do not know what the game is or who the players are. For example, commuters in a city can choose which routes to take to work. Their choices affect congestion on the roads, which determines the payoffs of other commuters. But no single commuter can be expected to know the others' commuting strategies or how their strategies influence his own commuting time. Similarly, in a market with many competing firms, no single firm is likely to know precisely what the other firms' marketing and pricing strategies are, or how these strategies affect its own profits (even though this assumption is routinely invoked in textbook models of competition). Likewise, traders in a financial market are typically unable to observe the strategies of the other traders, and probably do not even know the full set of players participating in the market.
In situations like these, one would like to have a learning procedure that does not depend on any knowledge of the others' actions or on their payoffs. Such a rule is said to be payoff-based or radically uncoupled (Foster and Young, 2006) . Are there simple payoff-based learning rules such that, when used by everyone in a game, period-by-period play comes close to Nash equilibrium play a large proportion of the time? Several recent papers show that the answer is affirmative. Foster and Young (2006) introduced a learning procedure called regret testing that has this property for all finite, two-person games.
Subsequently, Germano and Lugosi (2007) showed that regret testing leads to Nash equilibrium behavior in generic -person games on a given finite action space. n More recently, Marden, Young, Arslan, and Shamma (2007) , hereafter abbreviated MYAS, show that there are even simpler payoff-based learning rules that come close to pure Nash equilibrium behavior in the class of weakly acyclic games. These games have the property that from every joint action-tuple there exists a sequence of best replies --one player moving at a time --that ends at a pure Nash equilibrium. (Potential games and congestion games are special cases.) MYAS propose the following learning process: each player experiments in each period with very small probability, and adopts the experimental action if and only if his payoff increases. They prove that in any weakly acyclic game, this simple experimentation procedure implements Nash equilibrium in the sense that equilibrium behavior is observed in a very high proportion of all time periods.
A key feature of regret testing and the MYAS algorithm is that they cause periodby-period behavior to come close to equilibrium in a probabilistic sense, but behavior does not necessarily converge to equilibrium. Indeed, Hart and MasColell (2003) have shown that there are severe limits to what can be achieved if one insists on convergence and the learning procedure is not, in a certain sense, 'rigged.' One definition of 'not rigged' is that each player's learning rule should be independent of the opponents' payoffs; such a rule is said to be uncoupled.
Suppose further that each player's learning rule is deterministic and depends solely on the frequency distribution of past play (as in fictitious play). Hart and Mas-Colell (2003) show that there exists a large class of games for which no such rule, when used by all players, causes period-by-period behavior to converge to Nash equilibrium behavior. In a subsequent paper, they examine the situation where the learning procedure is stochastic, and is stationary with respect to histories of bounded length (Hart and Mas-Colell, 2006) . In this case one can design simple, uncoupled rules that converge almost surely to Nash equilibrium behavior for games with a pure Nash equilibrium, but not for games in general. 1 The results in the present paper differ from those of Hart and Mas-Colell in two key respects. First, we shall not insist on convergence to Nash equilibrium; it suffices that period-by-period play come close to Nash equilibrium quite often.
Second, we shall show to achieve this by a learning process that does not depend on the opponents' payoffs or their actions. (The framework in Hart and Mas-Colell (2006) relies on the observability of others' actions; in other words their learning procedure is uncoupled but not radically uncoupled.) Unlike regret testing, the learning rule proposed here does not rely on statistical estimation; it is also intuitively more plausible as a behavioral model. Unlike the simple trial-anderror procedure of MYAS, the rule works for almost all games that possess at least one pure Nash equilibrium. 2 A novel aspect of the approach is that a player's learning behavior depends on his mood, which can change if his recent payoffs are above or below his current expectations.
Mood-driven learning has been suggested as an empirical phenomenon in a number of recent studies (Capra, 2004; Smith and Dickhaut, 2005; Kirchsteiger, Rigotti, and Rustichini, 2006) 
Interactive trial and error learning
We shall consider a learning rule in which each agent has one of four possible moods: content, discontent, watchful, and hopeful. When an agent is content, he occasionally experiments with new strategies, and switches if the new one is better than the old. When discontent he tries out new strategies frequently and at random, eventually becoming content with a probability that depends on how well his current strategy is doing. These are the main states, and reflect the idea that search can be of two kinds: careful and directed (when content), or flailing around (when discontent). 
The precise form of the response function φ is not important for our results, though from a behavioral standpoint it is natural to assume that it is monotone increasing in the realized payoff u and monotone decreasing in the benchmark 
For a randomly generated game G on a finite strategy space A , interdependence holds generically, because it holds if there are no payoff ties. Notice, however, that interdependence is a considerably weaker condition: there can be many payoff ties so long as there is enough variation in payoffs that each subgroup can affect the payoff of someone not in the group by an appropriate choice of strategies.
Definition. Consider a stochastic process { } Notice that the theorem holds for all games in the given class provided that ε is small enough; in other words, the rate of experimentation does not have to be adjusted to the particular game in hand.
Discussion
Before proving theorem 1 formally let us briefly outline the argument. On the one hand, if the learning process is in a non-equilibrium state, it takes only one person to experiment with the 'right' action and the experiment will succeed (yield a higher payoff). Hence the process transits to a state having different benchmarks with probability at least ( ) O ε . On the other hand, if the process is in an equilibrium state, then at least two people must experiment together (or in close succession) for the experiments to succeed. Hence the process transits to a state with new benchmarks with probability at most 2 ( ) O ε . Thus, when ε is very small, the process stays in the equilibrium states much longer than in the disequilibrium states. The key point to establish is that the process enters an equilibrium state with reasonably high probability starting from an arbitrary initial state. This requires a detailed argument and is the place where the interdependence property is used.
As we have already remarked, a much simpler version of this procedure works for potential games and the more general class of weakly acyclic games. A game is weakly acyclic if, from every pure strategy-tuple there exists at least one sequence of strict better replies, one player moving at a time, that ends in a pure Nash equilibrium strategy-tuple. If all players use ordinary trial and error learning with sufficiently small experimentation probability G ε , and if the game is weakly acyclic, they play a stage-game pure Nash equilibrium at least 1 ε − of the time (Marden, Young, Arslan, and Shamma, 2007) . As we have also pointed out, ITE learning is not the only payoff-based procedure that leads to Nash equilibrium with high probability. Regret testing also has this property, and works for generic games with pure or mixed equilibria (Foster and Young, 2006; Germano and Lugosi, 2007) . Regret testing is more complex, however, because it relies on statistical estimation. Agents collect data and periodically compare the average payoffs generated by their current strategies with the average payoffs produced by occasional deviations. When the average payoff from deviating exceeds the average payoff from the current strategy by more than some tolerance level 0 τ > , the agent switches to a randomly chosen new strategy. In particular, the agent does not necessarily choose the strategy that actually did better when experimenting, hence the search has an undirected aspect. In ITE learning, by contrast, successful experiments are always implemented. Random search arises when payoffs got worse and the agent did not experiment; moreover even in this case the search is directed because higher realized payoffs lead the player to abandon the search with higher probability (assuming that φ is monotone increasing). This seems like a plausible behavioral hypothesis.
Proof of theorem 1: preliminaries
The proof uses the theory of perturbed Markov chains (Young, 1993) . Suppose that all players in the game use ITE learning with experimentation probability G ε and a given response function φ (which will be fixed throughout). 6 Let the probability transition matrix of this process be denoted by Starting from any initial state, the probability is one that the process eventually enters one of these classes and stays there ever after. To characterize the longrun behavior of P ε , it therefore suffices to examine its long-run behavior when restricted to each of the classes j Z . Let j P ε denote the process restricted to the recurrence class j Z . This process is irreducible, and the resistances of its 6 Players can have different experimentation probabilities provided they go to zero at the same rate. We could assume, for example, that each player i has an experimentation probability , where the parameter 0 i λ ε > ε is varied while the i λ are held fixed. This complicates the notation unnecessarily, so in the proofs we shall assume a common rate ε . 
The states such that z ( ) 0 j z μ > are said to be stochastically stable (Foster and Young, 1990) . In effect, they are the only states that have nonvanishing probability when the parameter ε becomes arbitrarily small.
Proof of theorem 1.
The proof of theorem 1 amounts to showing that: i) every recurrence class j Z
contains at least one all-content state in which the benchmarks constitute a pure Nash equilibrium of G ; ii) the stochastically stable states are all of this type. . Since all other transitions out of have resistance at least 1, is an easy path. As we have just noted, this is also a monotone increasing path in the sense that no one's benchmark payoff decreases and someone's strictly increases.
we are done. Otherwise there are three possibilities to consider: i) everyone in is content; ii) some are hopeful and no one is watchful; iii) someone is watchful. (No one can be discontent at this stage, since it takes at least two periods of disappointing payoffs to become discontent.)
We shall consider the third case in a moment. Notice, however, that if the continuation of the path always involves cases i) and ii), then it will always be monotone increasing. Since the state space is finite, it must come to an end, which can only happen when it reaches some equilibrium state in . By assumption G is interdependent, hence there exists an agent and an action-tuple
We claim that there is a sequence of four (or fewer) easy transitions that make all the agents in discontent. 
I claim that each of these transitions has zero resistance, so this is an easy path.
Indeed, in each transition the players in play their required actions and stay discontent, which has probability at least
where .
Meanwhile each of the players
a , which has probability 1 ε − if content, probability at least / m θ if discontent, and probability 1 if watchful or hopeful. These probabilities are all bounded away from zero when ε is small, hence all the transitions have zero resistance. Thus by state , and possibly earlier, the set of discontent agents has expanded from to or more . 
Non-generic payoffs
It is straightforward to construct games with non-generic payoffs such that ITE learning does not come close to Nash equilibrium behavior at any time, let alone most of the time. These examples require that the game have three or more players; ITE learning does come close to Nash equilibrium for all finite twoplayer games, as will be shown in Theorem 2.
First we demonstrate that some form of genericity is required when there are three or more players. Consider the three-person game in Figure 2 , where each player has two actions. There is a unique pure equilibrium in the lower northeast corner, and a best response cycle on the top square. Suppose that the process starts in a state where player 3 is content. Since her payoffs are constant, no amount of experimenting will produce better results, and nothing the other players do will trigger a change in her mood. In short, once player 3 begins in a content state she remains content and never changes action. If she starts by playing the action corresponding to the top square, no combination of actions by the other two players constitutes a Nash equilibrium. Hence there exist initial states from which ITE learning never leads to a pure Nash equilibrium even though there is one. (By contrast, if the process begins in a state where player 3 chooses the action corresponding to the lower square, the pure equilibrium will eventually be played with probability one.) The only part of the proof of theorem 1 that relied on the interdependence assumption was the proof of Claim 3. We shall show that this claim holds for two players without invoking interdependence, from which the theorem follows immediately.
Recall that denotes the set of states such that everyone is content and the benchmarks correspond to a pure Nash equilibrium. player 1 remains discontent, and player 2 becomes discontent. At this juncture both players are discontent. Hence in one more period they will jump to a pure Nash equilibrium, and in one period after that both will become content playing the Nash equilibrium, all with probability 
In this case player 1 has become watchful while player 2 is discontent, so in one more period they will both be discontent with probability 0 ( ) O ε . As we have already shown, this leads in two more easy steps to a Nash equilibrium, and we are done. It therefore only remains to consider the following.
Case 2b". and .
We claim that this case cannot occur. Recall that the players alternate in making best replies around the cycle. Since player 2 best responded in going from
, player 1 best responded in the previous move. It follows that is 1's best response to , from which we deduce that . Putting this together with the case 2b" assumption we obtain 
Extensions
Interactive trial and error learning can be generalized in several ways. One is to assume that players react only to "sizable" changes in payoffs. Given a real number 0 τ > , define ITE learning with payoff tolerance τ to be the same as before except that: i) a player becomes hopeful only if the gain in payoff relative to the previous benchmark is strictly greater than τ ; ii) a player becomes watchful only if the loss in payoff relative to the previous benchmark is strictly greater than τ .
Say that a game is τ -interdependent if any proper subset of players can --by an appropriate choice of joint actions --change the payoff of some player not in by more than
S S
τ . An argument very similar to that of theorem 1 shows the following: if a game has a τ -equilibrium and is τ -interdependent, ITE learning with tolerance τ and experimentation rate ε leads to τ -equilibrium play in at least 1 -ε of all time periods provided that ε is sufficiently small.
Extensions of the approach to learning mixed equilibria are not quite as straightforward. The obvious modification to make in this case is to assume that each player computes the average payoff over a large sample of plays before changing mood or strategy. If the players are using mixed strategies, however, there is always a risk --due to sample outcome variability --that the realized average payoffs will differ substantially from their expected values, and hence that one or more players changes mood and strategy due to "measurement error" rather than fundamentals. Thus one needs to assume that players only react to sizable changes in payoff and that the sample size is sufficiently large that sizable changes occur with very low probability. Moreover, for our method of proof to work, one would need to know that the game is τ -interdependent for a suitable value of τ , but this does not necessarily hold for the mixed strategy version of the game when the underlying game is τ -interdependent. (Consider for example a 2 x 2 game in which every two payoffs differ by more than τ . Each player may nevertheless have a mixed strategy that equalizes his own payoffs for all strategies of the opponent, in which case the mixed-strategy version is certainly not τ -interdependent). Thus, while it may be possible to extend the approach to handle mixed equilibria, the result would be more complex and perhaps not as intuitively appealing as the version described here.
To sum up, interactive trial and error learning is a simple procedure for learning pure equilibria that does not rely on statistical estimation (like regret testing) and does not require observability of the opponents' actions (like the procedure of
Hart and Mas-Colell).
Even simpler procedures --such as the MYAS experimentation rule --work for weakly acyclic games, of which potential games are a special case. We conclude that there exist simple heuristics that allow players to learn equilibrium in a wide variety of strategic situations even when they know nothing about the structure of the game, who the other players are, or what strategies they are pursuing.
